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Abstract—What observers have called the Internet of Things 
(IoT) presents privacy and security challenges for contemporary 
society. The conceptual model of the IoT evolved rapidly from 
technologies used to track parts in industrial supply chain 
management to a diverse set of smart technologies. This rapid 
evolution has merged several conceptually distinct technologies 
into a single, difficult-to-define concept. A key difficulty is 
defining what constitutes a “thing.” The term has been used to 
refer both to the things sensed, such as a star or the contents of a 
refrigerator, and to the things that do the sensing (devices). We 
argue that the Internet of Things is better conceptualized as an 
Internet of Devices (IoD) because devices, not things, act in a 
digital form and connect to the Internet. Along with the other 
requirements of an effective IoD, technologists and policy makers 
must develop standards, network protocols, identity management 
solutions, and governance for the IoD to address privacy and 
security challenges a priori rather than retrofitted after the fact. 
Privacy and security cannot easily be added to a system that is 
already deployed and established. In this paper, we define the 
IoT and the IoD and summarize the independent technologies 
from which they have evolved. We provide a five-stage general 
policy framework for evaluating privacy and security concerns in 
the IoD. Our framework seeks to provide a consistent approach 
to evaluating privacy and security concerns across all IoD 
technologies while remaining flexible enough to adapt to new 
technical developments. 
 




EFINING the Internet of Things (IoT) can be challenging 
and confusing because colloquial definitions fail to 
accurately reflect the technologies in development and 
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technical definitions are not easily mapped to real-world 
examples. What, exactly, is a thing and how does it relate to 
the Internet? As used colloquially and in the literature to date, 
things on the IoT may not be Internet-connected and may not 
even be electronic equipment. They might simply be every-
day objects that are represented by networked data. Initially, 
things were tagged with machine-readable identification 
technologies, like advanced Electronic Product Codes (EPC) 
or Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips. However, 
IoT is now used to refer to sensors or smart objects that are 
themselves Internet-connected. Feki et al. estimate that 50 to 
100 billion things will be connected to the Internet by 2020 
[1].  
This paper seeks to clarify the definition of the Internet of 
Things and provide a consistent set of terms for the various 
technical elements in the IoT. In particular, we introduce a 
consistent vocabulary that provides a way forward for 
technologists and policy makers seeking to mitigate threats to 
security and privacy that might result from IoT technologies.  
An important part of this vocabulary is separating things 
from devices. Ryan Calo defines the IoT as referring “to the 
possibility of billions of devices—including everyday 
appliances such as your refrigerator—one day being 
networked and interactive” [2]. Although this definition 
accurately captures the IoT’s excitement and promise, it does 
not identify the constituent technical elements in the IoT. In 
particular, a refrigerator is both a thing and a device. This dual 
role is not true of all objects that the IoT is considered to track. 
Consider that a refrigerator may track the groceries it stores so 
that it can automatically order replacements as needed, 
reducing the likelihood that individual consumers would run 
out of half and half for their morning coffee. In this case, the 
things being digitized, tracked, and made available for 
interaction are the contents of the refrigerator, but the device 
that makes this possible is the refrigerator itself. Some 
information about the refrigerator, such as the internal 
temperature, may also be digitized and made available, and in 
that case, the refrigerator would be both a thing and a device. 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
started a journal for research related to the Internet of Things 
in 2014, and their website defines the Internet of Things as 
follows:2 
“The Internet of Things is a self-configuring and 
 
2 http://iot.ieee.org/about.html  
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adaptive system consisting of networks of sensors 
and smart objects whose purpose is to interconnect 
“all” things, including every day and industrial 
objects, in such a way as to make them intelligent, 
programmable and more capable of interacting with 
humans.” 
This definition reflects an idealistic understanding of 
aspirations for the IoT rather than its current state. The IoT is 
not currently a fully self-configuring and adaptive system. The 
goal of connecting “all” things to the IoT, however, is further 
motivation for terminologically separating the things that are 
observed and the devices that observe them and exchange 
information with a network. There are an infinite number of 
things that will not themselves become part of the IoT.  For 
example, stars are things in any ordinary use of the word, and 
telescopes can provide digital information about stars, but 
absent faster-than-light travel we will not make stars 
“intelligent, programmable, and more capable of interacting 
with humans.” 
The IoT began with an easy-to-define concept: a network 
for tracking things based entirely on easy identification. 
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips were added to 
otherwise mundane things so that RFID readers placed at 
important locations in a facility could identify them easily and 
efficiently. Since RFID readers can be omnidirectional, a 
network of fixed-place readers can provide complete facility 
coverage. RFID is used in many industries to track parts in 
warehouses, assembly lines, and retail stores. For example, if 
all the merchandise in a store had RFID tags, then checking 
out could be as simple as moving the shopping cart past an 
RFID reader all at once rather than scanning every item 
individually. As simple as RFID technologies are, they still 
change the security and privacy analysis from non-RFID 
enabled scenarios. The RFID tags that make checking out so 
easy could also make it easy for someone in the parking lot 
with an RFID reader to know exactly what you purchased as 
you walk to your car. Consider also the RFID passport issued 
by the United States government. RFID chips make accessing 
information on passports much more efficient for customs, but 
also expose users to potential security and privacy risks [3] 
such as skimming and eavesdropping by an adversary [4]. 
In this paper, we distinguish between things and devices as 
follows.  Consider what happens if an RFID chip is removed 
from a piece of merchandise. The merchandise itself still 
exists as a thing, but it would no longer be connected to the 
IoT. This is a simple example of the need to disconnect things 
from devices. Alternatively, consider two systems for tracking 
cars as they travel through a city. In the first system, each 
license plate comes equipped with an RFID chip that can be 
read by an RFID reader at certain important intersections. The 
upper half of Figure 1 depicts this scenario with the RFID 
device reading the first license plate. In the second system, a 
high-speed camera capable of accurately interpreting license 
plates using image-processing algorithms reads each license 
plate. The lower half of Figure 1 depicts this scenario with the 
camera device reading the second license plate. Both systems 
are designed to track a thing category: license plates. 
However, the technologies used to do this are fundamentally 
different. In the first case, the license plate gained a new 
feature: the ability to broadcast its identity. In the second case, 
the license plate remains the same as it has for many years.  
In this paper, we define things to be any object about which 
a device collects data or upon which a device operates. In turn, 
we define devices as the technologies that collect data from 
their environment, interact with their environment, and 
communicate through their network. Calo’s definition refers to 
networking of “everyday appliances,” and in this case, a 
refrigerator is both a thing and a device. Specifically, it is a 
thing with an embedded device. 
 
Figure 1. Differentiating Things and Devices in Systems for Tracking 
Cars by License Plates 
We propose to substitute the term Internet of Devices (IoD) 
for the collection of technologies currently referred to as the 
IoT. Colloquial usage of the word ‘thing’ does not imply 
network communications. The term IoT no longer applies 
merely to devices that only provide identity information. 
Smarter devices capable of interacting with their environment 
are now commonly considered standard IoT devices. Consider 
thermostats that attempt to detect when homeowners are home 
and learn their travel patterns to improve the energy efficiency 
of heating and cooling the house. A traditional thermostat 
would not be a target for criminal activity, but a thermostat 
that learns when homeowners are absent might be. Google 
recently purchased Nest, a company that makes such a device, 
for $3.2 billion dollars [5]. An author for Wired described the 
purchase as something “that could finally bring the Internet of 
Things to life for all of us” [5]. Some Nest users also use 
Android phones, which are another Google product. When 
those users leave for home, their phones could tell their 
thermostats precisely when they left and, based on traffic, 
when to turn on the heat or air conditioning to ensure the 
home was prepared for their arrival. Although these 
technologies could be extremely convenient, there are security 
and privacy tradeoffs to adopting them. 
Conceptualizations of the IoT are changing. The 
differentiation between things and devices matches ordinary 
English usage while providing conceptual clarity about what 
will be networked. That clarity will be important for analyzing 
the security and privacy issues that arise from increasingly 
smart devices that interact with their environment and possibly 
learn from the data they collect. Security and privacy 
professionals need a flexible framework for understanding and 








things on the IoD. In this paper, we categorize IoD networks, 
provide example devices and use cases for each type of 
network, and provide a framework for examining the resulting 
security and privacy implications. Our categorization covers 
five types of IoD devices: 
1) ID devices. Simple identification-only devices that are 
physically attached to things (e.g. RFID) 
2) Remote sensors. Devices that can learn to recognize and 
identify things remotely (e.g. cameras with product 
recognition software) 
3) Smart devices. Sensors and articulators directly 
connected to (and potentially controlled through) the 
Internet. (e.g. home door locks that can be opened or 
locked using a mobile phone application) 
4) Application-specific computers. General purpose 
computing devices connected to the Internet, but 
designed only for the purpose of running a particular 
application. (e.g. a mall kiosk) 
5) General-purpose computing devices. 
We begin our security and privacy analysis using the 
simplest possible framework, which only considers whether a 
device accepts inputs or generates data. We grow our 
framework progressively to allow for analysis of more 
complicated devices and situations resulting from the IoD. We 
also differentiate the IoD from other important security and 
privacy concepts. For example, IoD devices may generate 
huge amounts of data. Are the privacy and security 
implications of this data better thought of as Big Data 
concerns or IoD concerns? IoD devices may report data to or 
receive commands from third-party servers. Should the 
privacy and security concerns for these devices be thought of 
as Cloud Computing concerns or IoD concerns? IoD devices 
are deployed in a wide variety of contexts, including public 
infrastructure and wearable devices. Where do Ubiquitous 
Computing concerns end and IoD concerns begin? 
Finally, we discuss how the pervasive availability of 
computing and networking exposes both government and 
private sector threats to individual privacy and security. The 
government routinely collects records of citizen activity, 
including employment records, income and property tax 
records, and voter rolls. What new records will the 
government collect when IoD devices are widely deployed? 
Although private industry cannot legally mandate data 
collection, companies regularly collect information as a by-
product of a service paid for directly by customers (e.g., phone 
companies that collect sensitive records as a by-product of 
phone services.) or by providing services to customers and 
generating revenue through advertising (e.g., social 
networking sites that use various forms of advertising.). What 
new threats to privacy and security will be raised by business 
models for companies selling IoD devices and services? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II introduces our terminology for the constituent elements of 
the IoD. In Section III, we review prior IoT research, focusing 
on security and privacy. In Section IV, we present our 
framework for examining the key security and privacy 
challenges of the IoD. In Section V, we outline a heuristic for 
conducting a privacy and security analysis for devices. In 
Section VI, we identify devices with key device attributes. 
Finally, we summarize our analysis in Section VII. 
II. TERMINOLOGY 
The IoT conceptual model evolved considerably since its 
inception, but IoT terminology has not evolved with the 
model, fostering ambiguity and confusion. We now define the 
key terms that we employ for the remainder of this paper, 
beginning with device and thing. We provide parenthetical 
clarifications when discussing terms as used by other authors.  
Device: A device is a combination of one or more 
components such as identifiers, sensors, or articulators 
(defined below) with a common control unit. If the device 
contains a sensor, then the composition must be uniquely 
identifiable. Similarly, if the device contains an articulator, 
then the composition must be addressable. An example device 
is an electric motor that reports its current speed and accepts 
commands for a new speed. Devices may, but do not have to, 
directly connect to the Internet. At least one component of a 
device must have some process for transmitting data to or 
receiving commands from the Internet. Consider a traffic 
sensor that collects data on the number of axles that pass over 
a particular section of highway. This device may not be 
directly connected to the Internet, but it is still considered a 
device if the data it collects is eventually made available either 
in a raw or aggregated form online. 
Thing: A thing is any object about which a device collects 
data or upon which a device operates. For example, if a license 
plate scanner were installed and used to track the license plate 
numbers of every car passing through a particular intersection, 
then all of those cars would be things. This definition matches 
Privat’s “extended things” [6], which we discuss in more 
detail in Section VI. We adapt Privat’s notion of extended 
things because the key characteristic of “things” on the IoD is 
that they would otherwise be considered ordinary objects that 
do not by default produce data about themselves available on 
the Internet. When an ordinary object is targeted, tracked, or 
augmented to have a virtual existence,3 it becomes a thing in 
the IoD. Moreover, if two devices were used to collect the 
same data set simply for redundancy purposes, this does not 
affect the number of things in the IoD. 
Component: Components are the parts of a device that 
communicate over a network, collect data about the device’s 
environment, affect state changes, or respond to identity 
requests. Sensors, articulators, and identifiers are all 
components.  
Articulator: Articulators are components that accept 
commands through an IoD network and effect an appropriate 
change in physical or virtual device state. An articulator must 
be addressable on its network. Examples devices employing 
articulators include automated door locks and smart grid 
power switches. A less obvious example of a device with an 
 
3 There are some interesting parallels to Plato’s Theory of Forms here, but 
they are perhaps outside the scope of this discussion. 
articulator is a standalone GPS receiver. It receives commands 
from satellites and articulates by updating a local display. 
Identifier: Identifiers are components that respond to 
identity requests. Identifiers may provide more than just 
identity information, but they can only provide information 
that they have been designed to provide. For example, an 
RFID is a device with an identifier component.  It may be used 
to provide a unique identification number along with other 
information about the thing in which it has been embedded. If 
an RFID is embedded in a passport, it might include the name, 
address, and country of origin for the person to whom the 
passport belonged. 
Sensor: Sensors are components that collect data about 
their environments and periodically transmit this data through 
an IoD network. Each sensor in each device must be uniquely 
distinguishable on their network. Example sensors include 
temperature and location sensors. 
IoD Communications Protocol: A system of rules for data 
exchange across a network and between devices. Some 
devices may support multiple, simultaneous communications 
protocols and networks and route data between them. A smart 
phone may accept data over a Bluetooth protocol and forward 
it over a cellular protocol to a final Internet-based destination. 
IoD Network: A set of devices that use a common IoD 
communications protocol to communicate with one another. 
IoD networks do not have to use communications protocols 
common to the Internet. Instead, they may choose to use a 
proprietary protocol for communications. 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between Devices,  Components, and Things 
The relationship between these defined entities is depicted 
in Figure 2 using notation borrowed from the Unified 
Modeling Language class diagram. The figure shows the three 
device components and how each relates to a thing. Devices 
are composed of one or more components, each of which is an 
identifier, a sensor, or an articulator. Multiple components on 
a device may use an IoD communications protocol to 
communicate over an IoD network. A single component may 
also communicate over multiple IoD networks. For example, a 
typical smart phone can connect simultaneously to a cellular, 
Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth network and selectively route data 
between them.  
Under these definitions, many devices are capable of 
rendering human beings as things. Although it may be strange 
to think of a human being as a thing, devices are often created 
with the explicit purpose of identifying, collecting data on, and 
interacting with humans. The Fitbit is a heath and fitness 
device that uses a variety of sensors to collect data on personal 
activity. Fitbits send data through a paired smart phone to 
company servers for analysis and later interaction. The data is 
collected only for the person carrying the Fitbit. Thus, the 
Fitbit is designed to treat the person as a thing. Carrying a 
Fitbit is not even the most invasive way that devices track 
human beings as things. In 2006, Applied Digital Solutions, 
Inc. sold over 1.7 million human-implantable RFID chips [7]. 
Human-implantable RFID chips wirelessly and automatically 
identify people for a variety of purposes, including medical 
records and payment systems. People like the convenience of 
being easily identifiable to computers. 
People might not even be aware of the devices that identify 
them as things. Consider an RFID tag sown into the lining of a 
coat for store inventory management. The tag is an identifier 
device and the coat is the thing with which the tag is 
associated. However, if the purchaser is also known, then an 
association between the tag and the purchaser can be inferred 
by possession. That person is also now a thing. Due to the 
special properties of some remote sensors, a person does not 
have to be physically associated with a sensor to be a thing. A 
network of video cameras coupled with facial recognition 
software could track people’s movements. In this example, a 
person associates with a device by simply and perhaps 
unwittingly walking into its range of view. We do not intend 
to de-humanize people by possibly categorizing them as 
things. Instead, we seek to accurately highlight the nature of 
the relationship between devices on the IoD and the people 
who carry them or are examined by them. 
 An object may be a device, a thing, both a device and a 
thing simultaneously, or neither a device nor a thing. Consider 
the smart home examples illustrated in Figure 3. In the 
diagram, boxes indicate objects. Rounded corners indicate that 
the object is also a component. Square corners with a single 
line border represent devices. Square corners with a double 
line border represent objects. Things are explicitly indicated 
with an arrow. A smart refrigerator containing an embedded 
RFID reader is on the left side of the figure. It can use the 
reader to enumerate its contents over an RF network. It 
contains exactly one RFID tagged carton. The tag is an 
identifier physically associated with the carton. This 
association makes the carton a thing. The refrigerator is 
connected to the Internet via Ethernet for product code lookup. 
The refrigerator is not a thing and remains only a device 
because no device, including itself, collects data about it, 
identifies it, or interacts with it. The embedded RFID reader 
collects data about the refrigerator’s contents, not about the 
refrigerator itself. If the refrigerator’s components 
(compressor, controller board, ice-maker) were RFID tagged 
and the reader capable of listing the refrigerator’s constituent 
parts for a maintenance technician, then the refrigerator would 




















Figure 3. Smart Home Terminology Examples 
A smart furnace appears on the right side of Figure 3. It 
contains two embedded components: a thermometer and a 
heating element. Although physically a part of the furnace, the 
thermometer detects the ambient temperature of the 
surrounding room and the furnace streams this data for 
external processing. The furnace also accepts commands to 
activate a heating element. The thermometer is insufficient to 
consider the furnace to be a thing because it does not collect 
data about the furnace. However, the external control of the 
heating element within the furnace does satisfy the definition 
and, thus, the furnace is both a device and a thing. 
Our notions of “device” and “thing” differ from the 
terminology sometimes used in prior work. Some, perhaps 
most, technical research makes no such differentiation 
between devices and things, but we believe that highlighting 
this difference is helpful for both engineers and policy makers. 
Both disciplines are concerned with things and devices, but 
differ in approach. Engineers design and build devices that are 
required to observe or interact with things. The device is their 
objective. Policy makers seek to affect a characteristic of one 
or more things, such as the privacy of persons. One way of 
achieving that objective is to regulate the device. Thus 
engineers and policy makers may approach things and devices 
from opposing sides of a means-ends analysis. 
III. RELATED WORK 
As computing devices became smaller, more power 
efficient, and cheaper to produce, they transformed early 
conceptualizations of an Internet of Tagged-Things into an 
Internet of Smart-Things, with a corresponding increase in 
exposure to security and privacy risks. In this section, we 
summarize and briefly examine the transition to the modern 
notion of the IoT. We first discuss radio frequency 
identification (RFID), where the term “Internet of Things” 
originated. Second, we discuss wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs), which mark the transition from devices that simply 
provide identity information to devices that can report on and 
interact with their environment. Third, we discuss IoT 
consumer applications in the smart home context. Fourth, we 
examine mobile computing and wearable computing. Finally, 
we examine an evolving Internet, which is changing from a 
network of computers and servers to include mobile and 
embedded devices. Throughout this section, when an author 
discusses an object, we parenthetically indicate the object’s 
designation in our terminology defined in Section II. For 
example, when we write: “The author performed a threat 
analysis of RFID tags (identifier) in the Internet of Things 
(IoD)”, the author originally wrote in terms of tags and the 
IoT. Identifier and IoD are the corresponding terms by our 
definitions. 
A. Radio Frequency Identification 
Kevin Ashton coined the phrase “Internet of Things” in a 
1998 presentation to Procter and Gamble [8]. He said, 
“Adding radio-frequency identification and sensors to 
everyday objects will create an Internet of Things, and lay the 
foundations of a new age of machine perception [8].” In its 
simplest form, an RFID system (network) consists of an RFID 
tag (identifier), an RFID reader (sensor), and a computational 
device to process input from the reader. RFID tags can be 
attached to or embedded within the object to be tracked. 
Readers can discover tags in their immediate vicinity and 
query their identifiers. RFID tags generally contain only a 
small amount of data, and they sometimes only provide a 
unique identifier [9]. Servers maintain information about 
tagged things and index them on the unique RFID identifier, 
which allows readers to query servers for more information 
[9]. 
Ashton and others founded the MIT Auto-ID Center that 
envisioned objects (things) tagged, identified, and tracked by 
RFID [10]. The Auto-ID Center designed the Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) as a wireless, digital tag to replace the 
Universal Product Code (UPC), commonly called a bar code, 
in supply chain management [11]. Retailer RFID readers could 
calculate inventory levels and automatically order goods 
(things) as required. RFID tags are small, and may remain 
unnoticed by individuals who have purchased products that 
were tracked through the supply chain using RFID tags. Thus, 
individuals may be unaware of RFID tagged things in their 
possession, allowing them to be tracked without their 
knowledge or consent. 
Early Internet regulation and policies significantly informed 
the European Union (EU) approach to the IoT with respect to 
privacy and security. In 2006, the EU Commission established 
IoT workshops, and in 2008 published a Staff Working 
Document [12]. After a comment period, the EU Commission 
published a plan5 with 14 lines of action, three of which 
related to privacy and security:  
Continuous monitoring of the privacy and the 
 























protection of personal data questions. The 
Commission will develop guidelines on the operation of 
RFID applications in compliance with privacy and data 
protection policy and elaborate to include privacy and 
trust in a ubiquitous information society. 
The “silence of the chips”.  The Commission will initiate 
a debate on the right of individuals to disconnect from 
their networked environment at will.  
Identification of emerging risks. The Commission will 
provide a policy framework meeting the IoT challenges 
to trust, acceptance, and security. 
In 2009, Rolf Weber summarized many EU concerns and 
actions taken to regulate the IoT [11]. At the time, IoT 
conceptual models were dominated by RFID and EPC. The 
not-for-profit association GS1 proposed the model developed 
at the MIT Auto-ID Center as the EPCglobal international 
standard. 
IoT technologies and standards, such as EPCglobal, were 
initially based on Internet standards. Consider object naming 
and identification. EPCglobal has an Object Naming Service 
(ONS), which is based on the Internet’s Domain Name 
Service (DNS) [11]. The Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) controls the Internet’s DNS 
service. Weber criticizes ICANN’s approach, claiming it lacks 
transparency and accountability [11]; he believes similar 
concerns will also apply to EPCglobal. For example, VeriSign 
currently operates the ONS directory service root node for 
EPCglobal and, as a result, has a great deal of practical 
influence over how EPCglobal operates. Weber concludes, 
“Since the IoT is not only a mere extension of today’s 
Internet, [...] the development of decentralized architectures 
and the promotion of a shared network of multi-
stakeholderism governance for the IoT is needed [11].” 
At least two IoT (IoD) research groups proposed adapting 
the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), an Internet 
standard for expressing privacy preferences [13], [14]. Tao 
and Peiran propose a P3P adaptation with three actors: an 
individual user, a service provider, and the ‘third party’ (a 
national or industrial supervisory party) [13]. They provide 
examples of information types and associated sensitivity 
levels, evaluation of user preferences by the service provider, 
and required authorities and responsibilities of the third party 
[13]. Ukil et al. also identified the individual data producer 
and data consumer as stakeholders in their negotiation-based 
privacy preservation technique [14]. They propose to extend 
the P3P XML-based schema to enable a Negotiation Module 
within the IoT to serve as an automated mediator between the 
individual and the service provider [14]. The Negotiation 
Module is governed by privacy policies that are, in turn, based 
upon privacy law [14]. Both Tao and Ukil use P3P to provide 
a basis for privacy in the IoT, but P3P has not been widely 
adopted because of concerns that limit its appeal [15]–[19]. In 
fact, some of the proposed P3P adaptations, like the automated 
negotiation modules that Ukil et al. propose, were not 
implemented in the original P3P specification due to 
implementation complexity, lack of interest from industry, and 
concerns that automated negotiation would not benefit 
consumers [19]. 
Similar to the above negotiation-based approach, Machara 
et al. propose to insert a Context Manager Middleware layer 
into the IoT (IoD) [20]. The context manager matches privacy 
requirements and guarantees encoded into data producer and 
consumer context contracts that are based upon meta-models. 
Rather than starting from a P3P baseline, the authors develop a 
model of an agreement between context producers and context 
consumers. Both the producer and consumer provide half- 
contracts that are matched at run-time by the context manger. 
The agreement is matched for one observable, i.e. the data to 
be read by the consumer [20]. If a match cannot be made 
between producer and consumer half-contracts, then the data 
is not accessible by the would-be consumer [20]. One of the 
advantages of this approach over the above P3P adaptations is 
in the ability to handle dynamic modifications to the producer 
and consumer contracts. Although these meta-models have 
been validated with a tool for checking model consistency, the 
Eclipse Modeling Framework, their complexity may be a 
significant obstacle to broad adoption, much like the above 
P3P negotiation. 
The IoT inherits the existing Internet’s security concerns 
multiplied by a greatly expanded scope and scale. An 
adversary would have little incentive to track an RFID 
encoded milk carton (thing). But an RFID encoded wallet 
(thing) linked to an individual, perhaps at point-of-sale, could 
be used to track its owner. Zhu et al. considered the security of 
connections between RFID tags (identifiers), readers 
(sensors), and backend systems such as the Object Name 
Service (ONS) [21]. They extend prior work on authenticated 
key exchange (AKE) in RFID systems (network) to handle 
mobile RFID readers (sensor), tag (identifier) corruption, 
reader (sensor) corruption, and multiple readers. The authors 
demonstrate the correctness of the proposed protocol and 
argue that it is more efficient than prior work in this area. 
Instead of proposing new network architectural components 
to address security and privacy, Benjamin Khoo performed a 
threat analysis on a hypothetical GS1 EPCglobal RFID system 
exposed to the public domain [22]. Effectively, he modeled a 
future IoT as the existing EPC system without additional 
security protocols as safeguards. His analysis enumerated the 
following nine threats and effects [22]: 
1) Rogue Reader: Read Confidential Data 
2) Eavesdropping: Read Confidential Data 
3) Relay Attack: Read and Write Confidential Data  
4) Replay Attack: Read and Write Confidential Data  
5) Tag Cloning: Read and Write Confidential Data  
6) Tracking People: Read Confidential Data 
7) Blocking: Denial-Of-Service 
8) Jamming: Denial-Of-Service 
9) Physical Tag Damage: Denial-Of-Service 
Khoo emphasizes that the current technology represented by 
the EPC system was designed for supply chain management 
and is not sufficient for a public IoT (IoD). “RFID technology 
is great for tracking and keeping stock of items or animals but 
if this is applied to humans there have to be laws and 
regulation to govern its operation and strong enforcement or 
audit to ensure compliance as it can be so easily abused [22].” 
Here, humans are things, whereas an RFID is a device. He 
stresses that these issues must be pro-actively resolved before 
RFID technology can enable the pervasive and ubiquitous 
computing expectations of the IoT (IoD). 
B. Wireless Sensor Networks 
As a network of sensor devices, a WSN is a ready candidate 
for incorporation into what has been called the IoT. Extension 
of WSNs to the IoT, however raises the terminological 
confusion that has led us to define the IoD. The terminological 
confusion created by the word “thing” is understandable based 
on the history.  The word “thing” applied initially to RFID 
chips, where the inventory item and the unique identifier were 
physically combined. When analysis expands to WSNs, then 
devices and things are entirely different.  The technical and 
policy issues raised by the connection of sensors means that 
the analytic focus should be on the sensors, which are devices, 
rather than on the particular things they are sensing. 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) predate IoT conceptual 
models. The Sound Surveillance System is one early example 
of a large-scale sensor network used by the US Department of 
Defense to track foreign submarines (things). In 1980, the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
initiated the Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN) program 
[23]. Additional DARPA programs such as Sensor 
Information Technology further developed robust, ad hoc 
networking and distributed information processing [23]. At the 
same time, advances in microelectromechanical systems 
decreased the size, power consumption, and cost of sensors 
(devices) while simultaneously increasing their range. The 
addition of wireless communications technology enabled the 
transition from DSNs to WSNs. 
A typical WSN is composed of a large number of self- 
contained, communicating sensor packages (devices) [24]. In 
the literature, these packages are often referred to as either 
sensor nodes or motes. The sensors are often densely 
distributed relative to their range in an ad-hoc manor and 
collaborate to provide observation data [24]. Each individual 
sensor node (device) may have minimal computational 
resources, but the aggregate network may have considerable 
computational capability [25]. Applications for WSNs include 
military, security, and environmental monitoring. Yick et al. 
categorize WSN applications as either Tracking or Monitoring 
[26]. Tracking targets include humans, animals, vehicles, and 
other objects (things). Monitoring targets include 
environmental conditions, patient health, factory automation, 
and other conditions (things). 
 Due to the ad-hoc nature of sensor node location, the 
network must be self-organizing [25]. Sensor nodes must be 
capable of discovering neighbor nodes and dynamically 
selecting data routes. Early WSN network topologies were 
predominately point-to-point and star designs that delivered 
data directly to a data collector (sink). Current WSN 
topologies operate on a mesh in which sensor nodes 
communicate with each other and collaboratively deliver 
observation data to the data sink [25]. These communications 
strategies provide resiliency in the complete system given 
individual sensor node failures and communications 
interference from physical obstacles. 
The European Union’s IoT Architecture (IoT-A) project 
produced a proposed reference architecture that provides 
interoperability between RFID systems and WSNs. Within 
this context, Gessner et al. consider the requirements for 
object resolution functions [27]. The authors’ work adds 
dynamic and secure capabilities to object (device) name 
resolution as the WSN migrates into the IoT-A infrastructure. 
Gessner et al. propose requirements for Authorization, 
Authentication, Identity Management, Key Exchange and 
Management, and Trust and Reputation Architecture [27]. The 
authorization module is comprised of either Role-Based 
Access Control (RBAC) or Attribute-Based Access Control 
(ABAC). Authentication, Identity Management, and Key 
Exchange is based upon existing PKI principles. The Trust 
and Reputation component gathers behavioral information 
about entities in the IoT and assigns a trustworthiness rating to 
each entity that other entities can access to determine their 
level of interaction [27]. The authors do not specify this 
module in any detail. They indicate that fuzzy logic, Bayesian 
networks, analytical expressions, or bio-inspired algorithms 
could quantitatively measure trust. They further indicate that 
trust could be modeled as a Boolean value, a discreet range of 
values, or a continuous interval. As a requirements analysis 
effort, the first four modules are reasonably concrete. 
However, the trust module is too ambiguous to reason about 
its implementation and interoperability. A further weakness is 
that RFID tags lack the computational resources to 
meaningfully participate in elements of the proposed scheme, 
such as Authentication. 
Incorporating WSN concepts into the IoT lead to early 
terminological issues that conflated the thing with the device. 
Privat challenged this assumption in his proposal to extend the 
Internet of Things to include mundane, un-communicating 
objects that attain thing-like properties due to the special 
remote tracking capabilities of some sensors [6]. He termed 
such objects sense-able things. For an example, we will 
consider a standard IoT transaction and compare it to a 
hypothetical extended IoT transaction. 
The smart refrigerator has almost become a caricature, but 
will serve to illustrate. One smart refrigerator is equipped with 
a RFID reader. The consumer opens the refrigerator, removes 
a carton of milk, and empties the carton into a glass. He then 
discards the empty carton into a waste bin. Overnight, the 
refrigerator uses its RFID reader to enumerate its contents and 
fails to detect any milk. It places an order for a fresh carton 
from the Acme Corporation for delivery the next morning. 
A second smart refrigerator is equipped with multiple 
interior cameras. The consumer opens the refrigerator, 
removes a carton of milk, and empties the carton into a glass. 
He then discards the empty carton into a waste bin. Overnight, 
the refrigerator uses it cameras to examine its contents. Its 
image detection and recognition software is unable to match 
with a milk container. It places an order for a fresh carton 
from the Acme Corporation for delivery the next morning. 
The carton in the first refrigerator is a thing by the prior 
definition. It has been equipped with electronic 
communications, an RFID tag. The carton in the second 
refrigerator is just a standard inanimate object. Yet, the sensor 
in the refrigerator allows the object to be treated in much the 
same way. One could argue that the imagined carton is not 
quite a thing because the refrigerator cannot distinguish 
between two different milk cartons, and thus is not completely 
identifiable. Nevertheless, the resulting behavior is identical. 
Similarly, an extensive network of automobile license plate 
scanners imbue un-ICT equipped cars with extended thing 
properties. And coupling facial recognition software with 
public surveillance cameras renders people as pseudo-things. 
Neither of these examples suffers from the quasi-identification 
of the refrigerator example. In each case, the object is 
uniquely identified. 
Another potential concern with WSNs is that a security-
compromised node (device) can reveal information from the 
complete system. Frequently, data is routed from node to node 
before eventually reaching the data sink. This ad hoc routing 
adds resiliency and robustness to the network, but exposes 
other sensor’s data at a compromised node. Vladimir 
Oleshchuk surveyed secure algorithms to perform distributed 
computation. He defines and provides examples of Secure 
Multiparty Computations (SMC) [28]. SMCs allow 
collaborative computation without any party divulging its own 
input. As an example, consider Yao’s Millionaire problem: 
How can two millionaires determine which is the richest 
without revealing their own net worth? In IoD terms, the same 
problem can be stated as determining which of two sensors 
reads the highest value without publishing either value. The 
author notes that generalized SMC solutions are impractical, 
but domain specific solutions can be suitable for constrained 
computing environments such as at the envisioned IoT (IoD). 
Oleshchuk describes two further SMC algorithms [28]. The 
secure sum protocol would allow a set of sensors to compute 
the sum of their values without disclosing any of their values. 
The last SMC given determines the intersection of two sets 
without disclosing non-common elements to the other party. 
For example, consider a campus door access lock (device) and 
a university student desiring access. The lock has an 
authorization list to which it is programmed to permit access 
to the room. The student also has an authorization list 
associated with their identification card (identifier). The 
secure set intersection allows the lock to determine if the 
student should have access without the student disclosing his 
list of authorizations or the lock disclosing its list of permitted 
identifiers. Reliable and secure WSNs provide a strong 
technological basis for future smart home and ubiquitous 
computing development. 
C. Smart Homes and Offices 
The IoD promises to radically transform our homes and 
offices. Tom Coates’s house in San Francisco provides a 
striking, if somewhat silly, example. Coates connected 
numerous sensors in his house to Twitter,6 and the house 
tweets an appropriate statement when a sensor receives certain 
inputs. For example, Tom installed a motion sensor in his 
sitting room, so when the house detects someone sitting down, 
it tweets, “Pretty sure there’s someone in the Sitting Room. 
@tomcoates is that you?” Coates has also installed moisture 
sensors for his house plants, temperature sensors in various 
locations, and light switch sensors so the house can tweet 
about the conditions of his ficus (thing), whether his air 
conditioner (thing) is operating, and when someone turns on 
the bedroom light (thing) [29]. Coates also uses web services 
to allow his @houseofcoates Twitter account to tweet that he’s 
not home when he checks in somewhere else on Foursquare,7 
a location-based social network [29]. All of the devices Coates 
has used to allow his house to tweet are commercially 
available and relatively inexpensive. 
The concept of a smart home is not new. In 1998, Georgia 
Tech began a project called the Aware Home Research 
Initiative [30]. This project’s goal is to enable research into 
how a controlled home environment can improve health, 
wellbeing, entertainment, and sustainability for residents. In 
2003, Cook et al. envisioned an agent-based approach for 
devices in a smart home to collect information on their 
physical environment, communicate this information to other 
devices, and make decisions based on this information 
regarding how to interact with their environment [31]. 
Algorithms like this have been in development for years, but 
the availability of sensors, like the ones Tom Coates uses to 
wire his home to Twitter, is cost prohibitive for most 
consumers. Most early research in smart homes focused on 
three areas: (1) improving healthcare, particularly elder care; 
(2) improving energy use through coordinated control of 
power-hungry appliances; and (3) improving daily life through 
entertainment and artificially intelligent convenient functions 
for the residents [32]. 
In parallel to smart home research, power systems 
researchers have explored how to build a smarter electrical 
grid. This smart grid research suggests that it may be possible 
for the power company to project with a great deal of accuracy 
which appliances a resident might be using and when they are 
using those appliances based entirely on the amount and 
signature of the power requirements of their house. 
Homes are relatively well protected in many privacy legal 
regimes around the world. In the U.S., the Fourth Amendment 
explicitly protects homes from unwarranted searches. It 
remains unclear how the Fourth Amendment might apply to 
smart home or smart grid data collected by or stored on third-
party servers. Current third party doctrine suggests that it will 
not receive as much protection as data stored inside the home. 
Kanuparthi et al. addressed some security and privacy 
threats from the smart home with Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs) [33]. PUFs are the hardware equivalent of a 
cryptographic one-way function and can be used in a 
 
6 The Twitter account can be found online at 
https://twitter.com/houseofcoates  
7 https://foursquare.com/  
challenge-response protocol [33]. When presented with a 
challenge, an instance of a PUF (device) responds with a 
repeatable response. However, the response is unpredictable 
across different instances of the PUF, even if manufactured 
with the same process. Kanuparthi et al. foresee a vast number 
of smart, networked devices such as “medical implants, alarm 
clocks, wearable systems, automobiles, washing machines, 
traffic lights, and the energy grid” [33]. In our nomenclature, 
all of these objects are devices, but some may not be things. 
For example, if a wearable system collects data about the 
wearer, then the wearable is just a device, not a thing. To 
accomplish security and privacy in this environment, 
Kanuparthi proposes to integrate PUFs into IoT sensors and 
use PUFs for device identity management [33]. Existing 
cryptography can then provide secure channels through the 
network. Unlike a standard PUF, a sensor PUF accepts two 
inputs, a challenge and a physical quantity. For a given 
(challenge, quantity) pair the sensor PUF always produces the 
same response and the response is also unpredictable across 
other physical instances of the sensor PUF [33]. The principle 
limitation to Kanuparthi’s approach is the reliability of current 
PUF manufacturing techniques and scalability to billions of 
devices. 
Even with a cryptographically secure home IoT network in 
place, a tremendous amount of personal data will flow through 
a smart home. How can a resident verify who has access to 
their data? Mayer et al. approached this problem using data 
visualization [34]. They used a standard network protocol 
analyzer to inform an augmented reality user interface 
enabling the visualization of data streams both within the 
smart home and externally to remote services [34]. A 
visualization aide of this type may have lead to an earlier 
detection of an LG smart television leaking privacy data [35]. 
It remains to be seen whether this approach would scale to 
dozens or hundreds of home devices that could be connected 
to external services for reasons such as: checking for firmware 
updates, logging permitted biometric data, and ordering 
depleted pantry items. A device that is not complying with its 
privacy settings will be difficult to detect amongst the larger 
flow of valid traffic. 
D. Wearable and Ubiquitous Computing 
Edith Ramirez, the Chairwoman of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) said in her opening remarks at the FTC 
Conference entitled “Internet of Things–Privacy and Security 
in a Connected World” that wearable healthcare devices are 
poised to revolutionize healthcare [36]. Wearable and 
ubiquitous computing (devices) may be poised to 
revolutionize more than just healthcare. Later in that same 
FTC Conference, Vint Cerf, the Chief Internet Evangelist at 
Google, said that Google Glass, an optical head-mounted 
display with a camera and microphone (composite), may one 
day allow a blind German speaker  (thing) to have a 
conversation with a deaf American Sign Language speaker 
(thing). Though it is clear that wearable and ubiquitous 
computing devices will have an important affect on society in 
the near future, we are no closer to understanding the impact 
they will have on individual security and privacy. 
One area where wearable and ubiquitous computing has 
already begun to affect society is in Location-Based Services 
(LBS). These devices introduce privacy concerns for IoD 
users because they could be misused for systematic mass 
surveillance. Recent development in mobile devices in terms 
of computational capacity, wireless connectivity, and 
geolocational devices enables portable access to location 
information. These devices include GPS satellite tracking, 
cellular tower triangulation, and WiFi fingerprinting and 
scanning. Any personal or wearable device that communicates 
regularly on standardize networks can also inadvertently 
regularly provide location information on the owner or user of 
the device. 
Elkhodr et al. surveyed privacy risks in Android, Apple 
iOS, and Windows Mobile phones to illuminate the nature and 
scale of the problem [37]. Enabling LBS on these devices can 
deliver some compelling services to the end-user. Your phone 
can provide turn-by-turn directions to a desired location or 
identify the closest coffee shop. However, as Elkhodr reports, 
keeping that information private is more difficult than most 
users presume [37]. They refer to a report from Lookout, an 
anti-virus and security firm, that around 300,000 mobile phone 
applications have access to the user’s personal data [37]. They 
also present the results of a joint study by Intel Labs, Penn 
State, and Duke University to monitor the behavior of a 
random sample of 30 out of the 358 most popular free 
applications for Android smart phones [37]. Of these 30, 15 of 
the applications were sending geographic location information 
to remote advertising servers. Seven of these applications even 
provided the phone’s unique hardware identifier [37]. This 
would allow for data from one application to be matched up 
with data from any other application that also provides access 
to the unique hardware identifier. 
In order to maintain the convenience of LBS without the 
corresponding privacy concerns, Liu et al. propose 
establishing a trusted middle-ware layer between the user and 
the service provider [38]. The phone’s LBS request services 
through the middle-ware that relays the request to the service 
provider through a pseudonymous account [38]. Hu et al. also 
propose a middle-ware layer of software to provide emergency 
access to LBS data [39], but they make no claims regarding 
data privacy. Although Liu’s approach has a few weaknesses, 
such as replacing a third-party service provider with a third-
party middle-ware provider and the lack of a guarantee that a 
pseudonymous account will not be re-identified [38], it does 
highlight a current feature of most wearable and ubiquitous 
computing devices: they generally communicate through a 
single device. 
Devices that can communicate over both WiFi and cellular 
communications networks can act as hubs and allow other 
devices that do not have WiFi or cellular connections to sync 
data to the Internet. Consider a Fitbit, which is a personal 
fitness tracker that must sync data to the Internet by way of 
some other device, such as a mobile phone. This model of a 
primary device upon which one or more satellite devices rely 
for communications is called a personal area network (PAN), 
and the IEEE is working on official protocols for PAN 
communications [40]. PANs offer a natural architecture for 
technical measures to protect privacy and security. 
E. An Evolving Internet 
 A final independent set of technologies that are evolving 
into what is commonly considered the “Internet of Things” is 
the Internet itself. Enhancements to existing Internet protocols 
and capabilities may be made to accommodate the IoD. 
Researchers are looking at improving current Internet 
protocols and standards for IoT (IoD) adoption. Wang and 
Wen specified enhancements to the Domain Name System 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol [41]. The currently 
prevalent DNS has numerous security issues such as cache 
poisoning. DNSSEC adds public key cryptography to 
authenticate DNS database updates and verify the authenticity 
of DNS query results. Essentially, the server side is secured 
with public key infrastructure (PKI) so that the client can trust 
the server, but symmetrical processes are not provided. The 
authors propose the application of PKI to the client as well 
[41]. They do not provide a nomenclature for their 
enhancements, but herein their enhanced DNSSEC will be 
called DNS+. To prevent an attacker from bypassing DNS+ 
and using network addresses learned in some other fashion, 
DNS+ will not resolve things to physical network addresses, 
but rather to random pseudo- addresses unique to each 
communication session for public side access [41]. This 
scheme also requires a network gateway+ to map the pseudo-
address to a physical address and to reject public side attempts 
for a direct connection to the physical address. The authors 
provide a security analysis to validate the proposed scheme. 
Nevertheless, several issues would impede practical 
applications of DNS+. Every consumer in the IoD would 
require a digital certificate, the routing protocols that underlie 
the current Internet would have to be revised to accommodate 
the gateway+, and every router would have to be able to 
determine a physical route to billions of things from a now 
randomized network address. 
A combination of context aware access control and data 
transformations protect privacy in Huang et al.’s Privacy 
Preserved Access Control [42]. As with the user preference 
models previously discussed in subsection III-A, this model 
also entails a data producer (sensor), a data consumer, and the 
IoT (IoD) as a platform for securely sharing data. Raw sensor 
data from the producer is first transformed as per the 
producer’s privacy settings. For example, individual data 
elements could be masked, stripped, or substituted with 
ambiguous values [42]. For data access, the authors describe a 
context aware, k-anonymity [43] policy and filter. They 
illustrate this point with an example of a producer/consumer 
pair who are colleagues and the data item is the individual’s 
current location. When the producer is on-duty, the consumer 
is permitted to access the producer’s exact location. When the 
producer is off-duty, a gridded location is returned satisfying 
k-anonymity [42]. Analyzing Huang’s model with our 
definitions demonstrates the importance of the distinction we 
make between devices and things. In this model, the sensor 
has a privacy setting, not the thing being sensed. Hence, the 
model presumes a physical association between the device and 
the thing. 
Evans and Eyers assert that access controls, such as RBAC 
and ABAC mentioned in subsection III-B, will not scale into 
the IoT (IoD) since these techniques require the naming of 
principles to be granted or denied access [44]. They maintain 
that in the highly dynamic environment of the IoT, ensuring 
consistent implementation of discretionary access would be 
impractical. They propose to use techniques from Information 
Flow Control (IFC) to directly label data packets with tagged 
values. This arrangement does presume the existence of a 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) to mediate access to the data. 
By digitally signing the packet, the TCB can detect if the tags 
have been altered or removed. Tags should be assigned as 
soon as possible after the generation of the data, preferably by 
the sensor itself [44]. To overcome objections that tagging is 
too computationally expensive, the authors demonstrate an 
implementation of packet tagging on two low-cost, common 
embedded micro controllers. The author’s approach is 
interesting, but it is difficult to overlook the requirement for a 
TCB. Also, a comprehensive ontology for the tagging of 
privacy related data would be difficult to achieve in advance. 
And once a tagging scheme was encoded into the embedded 
computational resources of the IoD devices, tag label 
management would likely be as difficult as access control 
principle name management. 
The current management structure for the Internet may pose 
challenges for adoption as the IoT network. Weber considers 
national regulation, international agreement, and self-
regulation as the appropriate legal source for IoT law [9]. He 
rejects national regulation as not meeting the IoT globalization 
requirements [9]. He acknowledges that neither international 
agreement nor self-regulation alone would be practical to 
implement and acceptable to preserving privacy [9]. He 
recommends a form of “co-regulation” in which government 
sets a general framework elaborated by the private sector [9]. 
Weber also notes the special difficulties in achieving 
globalization given the differing notions of privacy in various 
regions of the world [9]. 
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SECURITY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE IOD 
A. Security and Privacy Analysis Matrix 
Perhaps the simplest model for examining security and 
privacy on the Internet of Devices is a simple two-by-two 
matrix as shown in Figure 4. Stated as simply as possible, 
devices that accept input may have security concerns, and 
devices that produce output may have privacy concerns. Four 
types of devices exist in this model. Type 1 devices have both 
security and privacy concerns because they both accept inputs 
and produce outputs. Type 2 devices accept no inputs, but they 
still produce potentially many outputs. Therefore, Type 2 
devices may have privacy concerns. Type 3 devices accept 
inputs, but produce no outputs. Type 3 devices may have 
security concerns, but they cannot have privacy concerns. 
Type 4 devices accept no inputs or outputs, and they have no 
security or privacy concerns. 
This framework is easy to interpret, but is it useful for 
evaluating security and privacy in IoD devices? Are there 
devices that cleanly fit into each of these categories? General-
purpose computers are clearly Type 1 devices because they 
accept numerous inputs and are capable of producing even 
more outputs. Type 4 “devices” accept no inputs and produce 
no outputs. Technologies that fall into this category are 
unlikely to even be considered by society as technologies, like 
chairs, shoes, or hammers. These tools are so simple that they 
are considered to be everyday objects. 
Examples of Type 2 and Type 3 devices are more 
challenging to identify. If a Type 2 device accepts no inputs 
but produces outputs, then it may correspond to a sensor as 
defined in Section II. Similarly, a Type 3 device, which 
accepts inputs but produces no outputs, may correspond to an 
articulator. In both cases, the devices must be “pure” to 
cleanly fit into these types. If an articulator produced even a 
small output, the device would need to be considered a Type 1 
device. Similarly, if a Type 3 device accepted even a tiny 
input, it would actually be considered a Type 1 device. 
Although pure devices are extremely rare, they do exist. 
Security critical environments, such as air traffic control, 
commonly use bespoken unidirectional communications 
protocols. The Federal Aviation Administration standard 
Digital Altimeter Setting Instrument sensor transmits signals 
but does not have any circuitry to receive them. A Denial of 
Service could be performed by inducing noise on the 
transmission wire, but such an attack cannot impair the 
security of the sensor itself. Similar examples can be found for 
Type 3 devices. Smart locks for homes essentially just receive 




Figure 4. Simple Analysis Matrix, showing four basic device types 
Although Type 2 and 3 devices exist, they are the exception 
rather than the rule. Most devices run standard 
communications protocols that are inherently bidirectional. In 
order to both accept inputs and produce outputs, devices must 
include both sensors and articulators. If a device can be 
reduced to the sum of its component sensors and articulators, 
then we can perform an analysis as described in Figure 4. 
To demonstrate that this relatively simple approach can still 
yield meaningful results, we apply the figure to two common, 
existing, and similar devices. A handheld, standalone GPS 
such as produced by Garmin or TomTom receives satellite 
data to calculate location, is addressable by virtual of being in 
range, and responds to data input by updating a user display. 
Since a handheld GPS cannot transmit back, it is a pure 
articulator. Applying Figure 4, we can conclude that although 
the GPS may possess a security risk, it is no threat to privacy. 
In comparison, we consider a smartphone with a built-in GPS. 
The smartphone also receives satellite data to calculate 
location, but does not contain a complete Geographic 
Information System (GIS) database. It would not be able to 
provide any further information if it did not also contain a 
sensor to relay the calculated location to the GPS mapping 
provider. In turn the mapping provider sends enough GIS data 
to the smartphone to update its display. The smartphone GPS 
is a composite of both sensor and articulator things. Applying 
Figure 4, we see that smartphones may contain threats to both 
security and privacy. 
The framework as described thus far provides an 
oversimplification for actual devices, but it is useful as a 
starting point for our analysis. One way this is a simplification 
is the binary nature of the inputs accepted and outputs 
produced. A traffic counter designed to count the number of 
vehicles that pass over a section of a highway still has an 
output: the count of vehicles that have passed over the 
highway, possibly including time stamps for each vehicle. A 
smart traffic counter that could provide this data in real time 
would still have an extremely limited data collection process; 
it’s still limited to a single section of highway and only 
capable of counting axles that pass over its sole input. 
However, these outputs might be available to other devices 
over a network and the ease of access fundamentally changes 
the nature of the traffic counter. Could a networked system of 
traffic counters identify reckless driving? 
To address some of the limitations of our framework thus 
far, we may simply choose to examine devices based on their 
total number of inputs and outputs. This analysis allows us to 
create a continuous plot for devices rather than limiting our 
analysis to whether or not a device has any inputs. Devices 
with more inputs may be more of a security concern. 
Similarly, devices with more outputs could be more of a 
privacy concern. Figure 5 shows how this plot can be used to 
examine devices based on their total inputs and outputs. We 
might imagine that a city with networked parking meters 
would also want to install parking assistants, terminals posted 
on the street that could perform multiple parking functions. 
These terminals could accept additional inputs allowing them 
to serve users seeking to reserve a parking place at their 
destination. They could also allow a police officer to 
determine how long a particular vehicle has been parked 
outside the courthouse. Clearly, such a device poses both 
security and privacy concerns. Should the police be able to 
learn how long someone has been parked in a particular 
location? What if a combination of inputs exposed a bug that 
would allow anyone to learn that information, whether 
associated with law enforcement or not. 
 
 
Figure 5. A continuous model for security and privacy concerns for 
devices on the Internet of Devices 
The common use of standard bidirectional communications 
protocols means that many devices on the IoD will not be 
pure. This situation is exacerbated by the availability of low- 
cost, low-power general-purpose processors capable of 
running general-purpose operating systems. For example, 
Linux-based smart watches run an operating system that is 
strikingly similar to the operating system that powers a 
majority of web servers on the Internet. Even if a device is 
conceptually send-only, its underlying implementation may 
render it vulnerable to broad security threats. Security flaws in 
desktop operating systems are challenging to patch on a 
reasonable timetable. How much harder will it be to reliably 
update the security software installed on IoD devices that 
consumers do not even recognize as running an operating 
system? 
Applications of our framework are intended to provide 
guidance rather than answers. Examining only inputs and 
outputs is a simplification, but it is still useful. Consider a 
hypothetical media device that accesses online media content 
for movies, music, and books. The device only sends a media 
title and receives the media content. On a data volume basis, 
the reception is several magnitudes larger that the 
transmission. Nevertheless, the device does warrant a 
significant privacy analysis due to the media titles and an 
implicit association of the device with a user account. 
Inputs and outputs are not the only factors that may need to 
be examined. We may need to also distinguish between 
devices that communicate with people and devices that 
communicate with other devices. Devices that communicate 
with people could be considered the endpoints, the place 
where a security or privacy threat is actualized. Devices that 
communicate with other devices could be considered 
multipliers, which increase the impact a security or privacy 
threat might have once actualized. Our framework indirectly 
takes into account retention and archival of data transmitted by 
the device. A complete record of all media an individual has 
read or watched is a potential output, and thus greater risk to 
privacy than access to only the current media title. 
Another factor to consider is whether a device is 
autonomous or dependent upon human interaction for its 
inputs or outputs. Devices that can communicate without 
human interaction may pose less of a threat to security and 
privacy since their dependence may allow for additional 
safeguards, such as authentication mechanisms, to be put in 
place prior to their communication. Devices that can 
communicate autonomously or automatically without human 
intervention may not allow for similar safeguards. 
Extremely challenging analysis scenarios are easy to 
construct. Consider devices that accept many sensitive inputs, 
produce many sensitive outputs, and are able to communicate 
with either people or with other devices. They might 
communicate autonomously or with limited human input; for 
example, self-driving cars, autonomous drones, or citywide 
self-regulating traffic systems. Our framework begins to 
address the security and privacy concerns posed by these 
devices. 
B. Device Categories 
 
Our framework, which focuses on inputs and outputs, works 
well when used to analyze simple devices, but not all devices 
are simple. To examine how our framework applies to 
different devices, we introduce five device categories for the 
IoD. These device categories encompass a wide spectrum of 
types and computational capability as illustrated in Figure 6. 
We do not rigorously define each device category. Instead, we 
describe the general attributes of each category because the 
distinctions between categories are not easily made. Some 
devices could legitimately be analyzed from the perspective of 
more than one category. For each category, we provide 
example technologies that highlight core device characteristics 
representative of the category. In addition, we discuss briefly 
the applicability of our analysis framework, detailing the 
strengths and weaknesses of our approach. 
1) ID devices are simple identification-only devices that are 
physically attached to things. These devices are only capable 
of responding to identify interrogation. Examples include 
RFID and Near Field Communication (NFC) tags. The 
development of this classification of devices inspired the early 
proposals for the IoT. The tag may be adhered to an object, or 
may even be integrally implanted into the construction of an 
object. Tags support detection by a separate interrogating 
sensor device and respond to queries with identity 
















classification of the attached object, such as a one-quart milk 
carton. Also, the limited range of RF and NFC allows the 
sensor to infer geo-location of the object. It must be near the 
sensor. These properties allow a RFID reader equipped smart 
refrigerator to determine if it contains a carton of milk and to 
not count a disposed carton in the trash bin. Additional 
information can be encoded in the identity response. Including 
the date of production would enable the smart refrigerator to 
recognize an expired carton and a serial number would enable 
it to identify a particular carton. The transmission of this data 
by the tag device and reception by the sensor renders the 
object a thing in our definition. 
Simple identification-only devices are the closest devices to 
the ideal analysis outlined earlier in Figure 4. If the device has 
inputs, then it may have security concerns. If the device has 
outputs, then it may have privacy concerns. RFID devices 
accept as an input an RF signal that both indicates it should 
respond with its identifier and powers the device’s ability to 
provide the response. This is a security concern because if the 
RFID device is damaged and unable to respond to this input, 
there will be no way for the reader to differentiate that device 
from a non-existent identifier.  RFID devices also provide an 
output, the identification information. In the simplest case, this 
is information is built into the device when it is created, and 
the information cannot be updated after installed. Depending 
on the content of the information programed and the context in 
which it is accessed, this can be a privacy concern. 
2) Remote sensors can learn to recognize and identify 
things remotely. These devices can render an object into a 
thing without physical attachment. A camera can remotely 
collect data about objects by recording electromagnetic waves. 
A sonar-capable device can perform similarly with audio 
waves. A smart refrigerator could be equipped with an array of 
internal cameras and product recognition software instead of a 
RFID reader. By periodically analyzing imagery from these 
cameras, this refrigerator could also determine whether it 
contains a carton of milk. Even though no device has been 
attached to the carton, the refrigerator is still able to collect 
data about the carton. Hence, the carton is still a thing and not 
just an object. This may seem like an overly sophisticated 
solution to design a refrigerator, but analogous situations 
already exist when security cameras are coupled with facial 
recognition software. This combination has been employed to 
detect suspicious individuals at sporting events [45]–[47] and 
renders these individuals as things.  
Devices that use sensors to identify, recognize, and render 
objects as things also operate well with the basic analysis 
framework outlined in Figure 4. The sensors used to perform 
the recognition have an input, whether it is a photograph, a 
video, a scent, or some other potentially identifying data about 
a physical environment. This input is a potential security 
concern. If a license plate scanner is vandalized, perhaps by 
being covered in spray paint, then it cannot identify license 
plates. These devices also have outputs, which are privacy 
concerns. In contrast to the simple RFID device in the 
previous category, outputs from devices in this category may 
have a wide range of contextual privacy concerns. If a license 
plate has an RFID tag embedded in it, that tag may be read in 
contexts that are more revealing than the owner of the tag 
would prefer. If a license plate scanner uses a photography 
system to capture and read license plates, it may capture quite 
a bit more information than the just the license plate of the car.  
For example, it may capture an image of someone walking 
their dog on the sidewalk next to the car. 
3) Smart devices are sensors and articulators directly 
connected to (and potentially controlled through) the Internet. 
These devices are constructed from dedicated hardware, 
operating system, and/or application software. They perform a 
narrow range of functions, and are not upgradable once 
installed. A smart-home owner could use a mobile phone 
application to open the garage door, unlock the entrance door, 
and turn on the household lights. The garage door opener, the 
entrance door lock, and the individual light fixtures are each 
examples of this category.  
Devices with components that are directly connected to the 
Internet have security and privacy concerns that are not easily 
captured by a simple framework. A direct connection to the 
Internet is both a security and privacy concern simply because 
communication over Internet protocols requires both input and 
output. However, this description does not capture the myriad 
threats faced by devices directly connected to the Internet. If 
improperly mitigated, these threats might allow an attacker to 
remotely access the door lock to a house or office. 
4) Application-specific computers are derived from 
general-purpose computing devices connected to the Internet, 
but designed only for the purpose of running a particular 
application. These devices may utilize general-purpose 
hardware, operating system, and/or application software. They 
perform comprehensive functions within an application 
domain, and are upgradable after installation. This large 
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category includes devices such as interactive, automated 
kiosks, smart phones, bank automated teller machines, and 
smart watches that run Linux-derived operating systems.  
General-purpose computing devices that are designed to run 
a specific application face similar threats to security and 
privacy as smart devices. The key difference between them is 
that an application-specific computer may more easily be 
repurposed than a smart device. Consider a conference center 
kiosk that allows conference attendees to determine where 
sessions are located. This kiosk could be compromised by an 
attacker and turned into a node in a botnet. Worse, many 
kiosks deployed in this way have access to other computers on 
a trusted network. A compromised kiosk may allow an 
attacker access to other network resources and the information 
they contain. Organizations deploying and maintaining 
general-purpose computers intended to run a single application 
must maintain them as general-purpose computers rather than 
dumb terminals. 
5) General-purpose computing devices must utilize 
general-purpose hardware, operating system, and/or 
application software. They perform a broad range of functions 
that are non-specific to any single application domain, and are 
upgradable at any time. Laptops, workstations, and servers can 
be firmly placed in this category. Other devices such as smart 
phones and tablet computers are challenging to classify since 
they possess attributes of both application-specific and 
general-purpose computers.  
General-purpose computers have, as one might anticipate, 
quite a few security and privacy concerns. A simple 
examination of inputs and outputs is unlikely to suffice, and 
complete analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
the categorization of mobile devices, such as smart phones and 
tablets, as general purpose computing devices is an important 
consideration for the IoD. The non-computer look and feel of 
these devices may lead one to believe that they fall into an 
earlier category. Phones may even be thought of as everyday 
objects. It is critical that these devices are properly categorized 
and analyzed as general-purpose computers. 
Neither the matrix nor the continuous model for security 
and privacy concerns directly account for the extent to which 
data is propagated on the network, although indirectly greater 
amounts of data propagated can be considered as outputs. 
Consider a Personal Area Network (PAN) as a composite 
device mediated by an Internet-enabled smartphone and 
containing biometric sensors for blood pressure, pulse rate, 
and body temperature. A straightforward application of the 
privacy/security matrix to the device indicates a high risk of 
privacy threat. However, if the sensor data were only used to 
provide the user with a status display on the smartphone and 
never sent the data upstream, then the scope of the sensor data 
is constrained to the phone. And the sensors do not constitute 
a privacy threat unless the security of the phone is 
compromised. 
Black box analysis of device network communications may 
also complicate application of the models. Without access to 
the internal design details of a device, an analyst must resort to 
detection of transmitted and received data packets. However, 
detection may not be simple. For example, in November 2013 
the BBC reported the discovery of a privacy breach committed 
by an LG smart television [48]. The complainant recognized 
that some form of tracking was taking place because the TV’s 
user interface displayed targeted advertising. He possessed the 
tools and knowledge to investigate and found that the TV was 
sending channel selection information back to LG. Digging 
into the myriad of options, he found an opt-out configuration 
for “Collection of watching info,” which he promptly turned 
off. Somewhat surprisingly, the TV continued to send channel 
selection information to LG in plain text, along with a flag to 
indicate the customer had opted out. Further, if a USB device 
is attached to the TV, it sends a list of all filenames found to 
LG. 
This violation was found only due to the diligence of an IT 
professional. And LG could have evaded detection with only 
slightly more sophisticated technology or business models. If 
the data packet had been encrypted, it would have been more 
secure; even from the consumer. If the channel selection 
information been buffered and sent in bulk, it would have been 
more efficient; and less directly associated with channel 
selection. If LG has sold the collected information either to or 
in competition with Nielsen instead of selling targeted 
advertising, then this particular consumer would not have 
become suspicious.  
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) only engages after a 
consumer files a compliance complaint. How can technically 
proficient consumers detect non-compliance? In the LG 
television example above, the consumer used a simple form of 
flow analysis. Network packet monitoring software detected 
data packet flows that he did not expect to see. In part, this 
analysis was possible since the device was stand-alone and 
only required one flow analysis. As stand-alone devices 
accumulate, the number of flows to be analyzed increases 
linearly. In Figure 7, each of devices A – E can be analyzed 
separately. The addition of device F only requires analysis of a 
single additional flow. 
Stand-alone devices are not, however, the objective of the 
 
Figure 7. Stand-alone Devices 
IoD. In a recent press release, Samsung announced, “Samsung 
Smart Home’s unique functionality enables users to control 
and manage their home devices through a single application 
by connecting personal and home devices—from refrigerators 
and washing machines to Smart TVs, digital cameras, 
smartphones and even the wearable device GALAXY Gear—
through an integrated platform and server [49].” A flow 
diagram would look more like Figure 6 Figure 7 and the 
number of flows to be analyzed increases with the square of 
the number of devices. 
In a fully connected mesh of collaborating devices where 
each device may be communicating with all other devices, the 
addition of a single device can have effects throughout the 
mesh. An additional device may require re-analysis of the 
entire en-meshed system rather than just the single device. 
V. DIFFERENTIATING PRIVACY CONCERNS 
The Internet of Devices clearly poses challenges for 
security and privacy, but it is not the only challenge for 
security and privacy. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier discuss 
the massive amounts of data and metadata being created by 
devices in all levels of modern society as a Big Data privacy 
concern [50]. For devices that fall closer to the first two 
categories in the spectrum discussed in Section IV, the 
backend processing and analysis of data collected may best be 
thought of as a Cloud Computing Concern [51]. Autonomous 
devices, whether simple or complex, could justifiably be 
thought of as robots or drones, which also have a separate 
scholarship related to privacy [52]. Similarly, ubiquitous 
computing is another field in which scholars examine security 
and privacy concerns [53]. In this section, we discuss where 
each of these approaches to security and privacy may be 
applicable for devices and the IoD. 
No bright lines separate Big Data security and privacy 
concerns from Internet of Things concerns. This lack of clarity 
is partially due to the challenge of defining both Big Data and 
the Internet of Things. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
explicitly state that there is no rigorous definition for Big 
Data, and they instead choose to focus on the attributes of Big 
Data that are unique to Big Data [50]. For example, they say 
that “big data refers to things one can do at a large scale that 
cannot be done at a smaller one” [50]. Often, the ability to do 
things at a large scale will depend entirely upon data collected 
using IoD devices. Consider a large retailer, like Walmart, that 
uses RFID tracking on all of their merchandise in all of their 
stores. In this case, such a system allows the retailer to identify 
insights and opportunities that would not be possible without 
that scale. 
Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier also describe big data as 
involving statistical calculations wherein the sample size is so 
large that it is effectively equal to the population size, 
allowing a transition from inferential to descriptive statistics 
[50]. IoD devices may enable these sorts of statistics. Consider 
the license plate tracking scenario discussed earlier. If license 
plate scanners are installed at every intersection in a city, it 
may be possible to track in real time all traffic at all times. 
City planners would no longer need predictive statistics to 
estimate traffic flows; they could simply use the actual number 
of vehicles. The IEEE’s aspirational definition of the IoT 
claims that the purpose of the IoT is to “interconnect ‘all’ 
things,” which is clearly related to the aspects of big data 
related to statistical calculations where n = all. If the 
“Database of Ruin” [54] is a consequence of Big Data, then a 
critical concern for the IoD is that it expands opportunities for 
growing the Database of Ruin. 
If IoD simple devices, particularly devices closer to the first 
two categories in our spectrum, are intended to collect 
information on ‘all’ things, then they will need the support of 
Cloud Computing technologies. Discussions of cloud 
computing security and privacy concerns predate similar 
discussions regarding the IoD [51]. The continuous recording 
of data generated by IoD devices to a backend database 
substantially increases security and privacy risks. A house 
connected to a smart electrical grid can detect which devices 
are used by the residents, when those devices are used, and 
how long they are used. A power company collecting and 
processing this data on the cloud is in an excellent position to 
learn intimate details of individuals’ lives. The amount of data 
that can be inferred by a smart meter is considerable, including 
identifying the program playing on the television [55]. Third 
party doctrine is a particular concern for privacy in cloud 
computing services [56], [57]. Cloud computing as also 
further exacerbated location-based jurisdiction issues for legal 
systems all over the world [58]. If IoD infrastructure is based 
on cloud computing technologies, then it will likely be 
beneficial to consider both approaches to examining security 
and privacy concerns. 
Most cloud computing technologies are thought of as 
technologies, but the IoD emphasizes the extension of 
technology into spaces that are currently thought of as every 
day objects. As a result, cloud computing security and privacy 
concerns may not simply need to be considered in addition to 
IoD security and privacy concerns. In fact, the two areas may 
amplify one another. IoD devices we have discussed in this 
paper, like the smart refrigerator or the smart parking meter, 
 
Figure 8. Collaborating Devices 
may have serious implications for security and privacy 
specifically because they are not thought of as technologies. 
Bruce Schneier highlights the role that subtle social and 
technological cues inform trust and the implications these cues 
have on security and privacy concerns for the resulting socio-
technical systems [59]. Technologies that are not thought of as 
technologies may prove to be riskier simply because people do 
not realize there are security and privacy risks or because 
people are more willing to forgo security and privacy in favor 
of convenience. 
Autonomous devices and robots are another area where 
added convenience and utility may require a trade-off in 
security and privacy. Although IoD devices are not required to 
be robots in and of themselves, the aspirational view that IoD 
devices will be self-configuring, adaptive, intelligent, 
programmable, and more capable of interacting with humans 
is not dissimilar from the colloquial definition of a robot. In 
addition, current robots fill roles traditionally performed by 
people using common, everyday objects, which further 
suggests a shared set of security and privacy concerns between 
the IoD and robotics. Examples of these devices include 
iRobot’s autonomous vacuum cleaner and Amazon’s proposed 
drone- delivery system. Ryan Calo claims that robots raise 
privacy concerns “practically by definition” because they are 
able to “sense, process, and record the world around them” 
[60]. Certainly, Nest’s learning thermostat fits this definition. 
The IoD and robotics communities may overlap most in 
technologies that use artificially intelligent swarm-based 
algorithms. These technologies consist of simple devices that 
use basic interactions with their local environment or with one 
another to perform tasks leading towards emergent behaviors. 
These simple devices are closest to current IoD devices, and 
research in WSNs and self-configuring networks may 
naturally evolve to use swarm algorithms. Commercial 
applications of swarm-based robotics are not common yet, but 
it remains extremely promising and has a long history as a 
field of research [61]. Consider Google’s driverless car 
project. Commutes would become shorter if every car on the 
highway participated in a swarm algorithm designed to mimic 
animal herding or bird flocking, but what are the privacy 
implications for those choosing not to participate? 
Ubiquitous computing, often called ubicomp, is an umbrella 
concept that includes the colloquial understanding of the 
Internet of Things [53]. If the Internet of Things connects “all” 
devices, then ubicomp encompasses this concept and adds to it 
other concepts, like pervasive computing, haptic computing, 
distributed computing, and wearable computing. Researchers 
and technologists understand that ubicomp poses additional 
challenges to security and privacy [53], [62], [63]. The 
solutions and mitigations for those challenges may apply to 
IoD challenges as well. 
VI. SUMMARY 
The conceptual model of the Internet of Things has evolved 
rapidly from a domain specific solution in supply chain 
management to a generalized platform for ubiquitous 
computing. Many open problems remain for technologists and 
policy analysts seeking to build, deploy, and regulate IoD 
devices, including privacy, security, standards, network 
protocols, identity management, and governance. Our paper 
provides three contributions that may address some of these 
open problems: (1) clarifying IoD definitions; (2) providing a 
framework for security and privacy analysis; and (3) providing 
guidance for where this analysis may need to be supplemented 
from other fields of research. 
We began by addressing the confusing definitions for 
“things” in the Internet of Things. We introduce a concept for 
“devices,” which refers to the technologies that collect data or 
interact with their environment, and differentiate them from 
“things,” which refers to objects about which data is collected. 
Our clarification of “things” and “devices” includes a 
categorization of five types of IoD devices. These types are 
not rigidly defined, and they are best thought of as a spectrum 
of devices from simple identification-only devices to general 
purpose computing devices. Understanding the differences 
between these device types allows for a easier examination of 
security and privacy concerns. The more complex the device, 
the more complex the potential security and privacy concerns 
may be. 
We also provide a simple framework for analyzing security 
and privacy concerns for devices on the IoD. Beginning with 
the simplest possible abstraction, we examine devices that 
accept inputs for security concerns and devices that produce 
outputs for privacy concerns. Although this simplification is 
not a perfectly representative abstraction, it can be useful in 
avoiding egregious errors of judgment. Furthermore, it is an 
extremely easy framework to apply to new devices. 
Finally, we differentiated security and privacy concerns 
stemming from the IoD from security and privacy concerns 
that may best be examined under another context. In 
particular, we compared and contrasted concerns from the 
IoD, Big Data, Cloud Computing, Robotics, and Ubiquitous 
Computing. Each of these concepts has some overlap with 
technologies commonly considered to be part of the IoD, and 
understanding these areas of overlap is critical to properly 
resolving or mitigating security and privacy concerns for 
deployed systems. 
The Internet of Devices will dramatically reshape the way 
we live and work. In some ways, the IoD is already here. The 
International Telecoms Union claims that at some point in 
2014 cell phones will outnumber people [64]. The United 
Nations claims that more people have access to cell phones 
than toilets [65]. Consumers expect their every day objects to 
be smarter and more responsive than they did even a short 
time ago. A recent video of a 1-year-old attempting to treat a 
magazine like an iPad and finding it to be “broken” highlights 
how quickly this transition is taking place [66]. How soon will 
people who do not own a smart thermostat be as outmoded as 
people who do not have indoor plumbing? How quickly will 
cities with smart traffic analysis systems outnumber those that 
rely on upfront transportation planning? Most importantly, 
will technologists and policy analysts be prepared to examine 
the inevitable security and privacy concerns that arise when 
the IoD arrives? 
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